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Abstract: 
According to Richard Swinburne, the principle of simplicity is of great importance to theory 
choice scenarios and theoretical changes in the sciences. In particular, he holds that the theory 
choice criterion of fit with background evidence can be reduced to the criteria of simplicity 
and of yielding the data. We will, however, rebut this reduction thesis and show that three 
central aspects of theoretical change (confirming power of empirical data, reliability of 
experimental methods, and truth of new theoretical proposals) cannot be adequately 
reconstructed if simplicity is regarded as a key criterion of theory choice. 
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1    Introduction 
How is it that we can choose between alternative explanations, hypotheses or theories? By 
means of which criteria do we figure out which one out of a number of rival explanations, 
hypotheses or theories is the one most probably true? The answer given by Richard 
Swinburne reads: There are four criteria which direct the choice between competing theories 
in the sciences.1 These are, first, the two a posteriori criteria of how well a given theory yields 
the data it is supposed to explain and how well it fits with the background evidence. On the 
other hand, there are the two a priori criteria of scope and simplicity (Cf. SET, 11-13 and EJ, 
80-83). 
All four criteria of theory choice Swinburne holds to be of epistemic nature, which is to say, 
they are decisive factors in judging whether one theory is more probably true than another. 
Thus, if 
(1) a theory T1 yields more data than its rival theory T2 does, or if it yields data that is 
attributed a higher degree of probability, 
(2)  T1 fits better with our background evidence than does T2, 
                                                 
1 Like Swinburne, we will limit our discussion to theory choice in the sciences: „limiting myself mainly to cases 
where the hypothesis at stake is a scientific theory consisting of one or more purported laws of nature. “ (SET, 
13) 
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(3) the scope of T1 is more limited than that of T2, 
(4) and if T1 is simpler than T2 in the sense suggested by Swinburne,  
then T1 is more probably true than T2. If, however, T1 is not to be preferred to T2 on grounds 
of fulfilment of all four criteria, shortcomings in one area may be compensated by good 
satisfaction of another criterion. Swinburne himself is aware of the fact that the weighing of 
criteria is a complicated matter, which is why he does not advance any theory on how to 
measure a theory’s degree of fulfilment of the criteria or of how to ponder these degrees 
against one another. Due to this problem Swinburne restricts his discussion to cases in which 
theories differ regarding satisfaction of one criterion only (Cf. SET, 14-15). 
Moreover, the four criteria are not equally central in determining which theory is to be chosen 
out of a number of rival theories. In his writings, Swinburne emphasizes the role of the 
criterion of simplicity, as the title of his lecture Simplicity as Evidence of Truth indicates. This 
is because except for simplicity, Swinburne claims, the importance of the role each of these 
criteria play in the process of theory choice is widely acknowledged and uncontroversial. To 
him, the strictly a priori criterion of simplicity is of such importance regarding theory change 
that without it, “we would be utterly lost.” (SET, 15) 
The salience of the criterion of simplicity being of such concern to Swinburne, it will also be 
the main topic of our paper. This being so, we will not dispute Swinburne’s definition of 
simplicity in terms of the six facets he names in Simplicity as Evidence of Truth. We will, 
however, provide an argument against Swinburne’s claim that in scientific theoretical 
progress the criterion of simplicity has to be attributed the very superior function among the 
four criteria for theory choice. 
In doing so, we will first analyse the main part of Swinburne’s argument for the superiority of 
the criterion of simplicity, namely his claim that there is a relation of reduction between the 
criterion of fit with background evidence on the one side, and the criteria of simplicity and of 
yielding the data on the other. Second, we will confront Swinburne’s theory choice criterion 
of simplicity with three central aspects of theoretical change in science and show that the 
concepts of plausibility and acceptability, rather than that of simplicity, give rise to an 
adequate reconstruction of these aspects. Furthermore, we will argue that Swinburne’s 
concept of simplicity cannot capture the mechanisms on grounds of which scientific progress 





2    Swinburne’s reduction thesis 
2.1    The prominence of the criterion of simplicity 
Swinburne’s argument for the prominence of the criterion of simplicity in theory choice can 
be reconstructed in the following way: 
(1) The criterion of scope needs to be assigned minor importance as its fulfilment seldom 
influences a theory’s degree of truth, for in most cases if a theory fulfils the remaining three 
criteria, the question of scope hardly affects its degree of truth.2 
(2) The criterion of fit with background evidence is reducible to the criteria of simplicity and 
yielding the data (Cf. SET, 15 and EJ, 41, 95-96). This issue will be dealt with in more detail 
below. 
(3) If we neglect the criterion of scope and reduce the criterion of fit with background 
evidence to the remaining two criteria, any choice between two rival theories that yield the 
data equally well would have to be considered impossible if it were not for the criterion of 
simplicity.3 
Again, this argument is valid only if there is indeed a relation of reduction between the two 
criteria of simplicity and yielding the data. This relation will be discussed below. 
Simplicity plays yet another role in regard to the criterion of fit with background evidence. 
Swinburne claims that it is through the criterion of simplicity that we judge which theories fit 
with our background evidence and which do not: In judging whether a theory T1 or its rival 
theory T2 fits better with our background evidence, we really go by simplicity. But just how 
do we do this? According to Swinburne, in the sciences we do not compare the theories by 
referring to the degrees of simplicity they incorporate if seen by themselves as isolated 
theories, but rather we are concerned with the question which of the theories conveys a 
simpler overall picture if taken together with our background evidence (Cf. EJ, 96 and SET, 
41). For example, a theory T1 which postulates the existence of five chemical elements is 
certainly simpler than a theory T2 which suggests that there are a hundred and eighteen 
chemical elements, but this is true only if both theories are being considered in isolation. 
However, if within the background evidence we find reason to believe that there propably 
exists a large number of chemical elements, we would be justified in choosing T2 over T1. 
Thus, T2 is the less simple theory if seen by itself, but if considered in the light of background 
evidence, T2 plus background evidence provides a simpler overall description of the world. 
                                                 
2 „[T]he influence of this criterion is not very great when we are dealing with hypotheses that satisfy the other 
criteria very well.“ (EJ, 82) 
3 „[W]ithout the criterion of simplicity we can make no step beyond the observable data.“ (SET, 15) 
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Before we explore whether the relation between the three criteria – scope being neglected – 
can in fact be considered a reduction, we will have to make some preliminary remarks as to 
what Swinburne means when referring to ‘background evidence.‘ 
 
2.2    The need to clarify the concept of ‚background evidence‘ 
In his writings on the four criteria for theory choice, Swinburne remains very unspecific as to 
what ‘background evidence‘ amounts to, and he seems to do so deliberately. Sometimes, 
however, background evidence is sketched as “everything else that we believe we know about 
the world” (EJ, 80), so that it seems that Swinburne uses the terms ‘background evidence‘ and 
‘background knowledge‘  almost interchangeably. 
As for the expression ‘background evidence‘, two things should be noted. First, according to 
Swinburne there seems to be evidence in the narrow sense, which differs from what he holds 
to be background evidence. Evidence in the narrow sense is evidence immediately relevant 
for the hypothesis in question. Background evidence, on the other hand, is all the evidence not 
directly relevant for the treatment of the respective hypothesis (Cf. EJ, 80, 151). Concerning 
theory choice in the sciences, the background evidence a given theory must fit with is 
constituted by theories of neighbouring fields or areas of wider scope. No answer is given, 
however, to the pressing questions of which criteria determine neighbourhood of fields or 
why theories have to fit with theories of neighbouring fields and not with theories of the same 
field. Also, for reasons unspecified, Swinburne neglects the subject of whether we can 
actually distinguish between evidence in the narrow sense and background evidence, as is 
evident in the following passage: „There are various ways of doing this [that is, making a 
distinction], and not a great deal turns on whether or how it is done.“ (EJ, 151) 
Also, like his explanation of the expression ‘background‘, Swinburne’s remarks concerning 
evidence remain rather vague, which he himself concedes in characterizing his accounts as 
“very loose holding-accounts“ (EJ, 80). This, however, is problematic, as it obscures a certain 
ambiguity in Swinburne’s use of the term: On the one hand, Swinburne seems to refer to 
empirical data (or phenomena or observations) when using the expression ‘evidence‘. For 
instance, he provides an example consisting of the hypothesis that John stole the money from 
the safe and evidence regarding John’s character gathered beforehand (Cf. EJ, 81). Other 
passages suggest that what is meant by ‘background evidence‘ is not empirical data, but 
scientific theories. This is the case whenever Swinburne makes observations on the special 
context of theory choice in the sciences (Cf. SET, 41-43 and EJ, 95-96). 
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Considering this, it appears to us that Swinburne’s ambiguous use of the expression 
‘background evidence‘ should not be dismissed by calling it a mere conceptual discrepancy 
without consequences. It is only through acknowledging that background evidence subdivides 
into two components, namely background data and background theories, that it becomes clear 
that the relation of reduction – insofar as it is legitimate to talk about a reduction at all – holds 





The remaining half of the criterion, that is, fit with background data, proves to be a subtype to 
the criterion of yielding the data, since for a theory to yield the data is for it to yield all the 
relevant data. According to Swinburne’s own explications of the term ‘background‘, 
background data are data which are not directly relevant for the theory in question but 
immediately relevant. Hence, the set of background data of a given theory is a subset of the set 
of data this theory has to yield. 
 
2.3 The relation between the criterion of fit with background theories and the criterion of   
simplicity 
This said, we will now direct our attention towards the question if, and if so, in how far, the 
relation that exists between the criterion of fit with background theories and the criterion of 
















As shown in section 2.1, Swinburne’s claim is that in judging whether theory T1 fits in better 
with the available background theories than does its rival theory T2, both theories have to be 
considered not in isolation, but as complexes consisting of the respective theory in 
conjunction with the body of background theories. These complex belief systems will then be 
compared to each other in terms of the six facets of simplicity and the simpler will be chosen. 
Evidently, Swinburne claims that considerations of fit are really considerations of simplicity, 
which is to say that „‚[f]itting better‘ is ‚fitting more simply‘, and thus making for a simple 
overall view of the world.“ (SET, 40) But just how are we to understand these claims? On the 
one hand, Swinburne seems to say that, as considerations of fit are the same as considerations 
of simplicity, the criteria of fit with background theories and simplicity are identical at the end 
of the day, despite the different labels. On the other hand, he seems to hold the weaker 
hypothesis that these criteria are not identical, but that the criterion of fit with background 
theories is in some way reducible to the criterion of simplicity (Cf. SET, 15 and EJ 41, 95-96). 
We believe that Swinburne can assume neither the first nor the second option. There is one 
point, however, to which we agree: applying the criteria independently of each other results in 
preference of exactly the same range of theories. If ‘F‘ stands for the three-place predicate ‘p 
fits better with q than does r’ [F(p, q, r)] and ‘S‘ stands for the two-place predicate ‘p is 
simpler than q’ [S(p, q)], and the relevant universe of discourse is the set of all (systems of) 
sentences, then the following equivalence holds: F(p, q, r) ≡ S (p  q, r  q). This means, for 
example, that in theory choice scenarios, if a theoretical proposal p fits better with 
background theory q than an alternative theoretical proposal r does, the conjunction of p and q 
is simpler than the conjunction of r and q. However, the extensions of the two predicates so 
introduced are radically distinct, since they contain different kinds of elements, namely tuples 
and triples, respectively. What is more, the intensions of the predicates clearly differ. Even if 
applying the predicates independently of each other leads to preference of the same theories, 
they still have different meanings. 
As for Swinburne’s weaker hypothesis, that is, that the two criteria are not identical, but that 
the criterion of fit with background theories can in some way be reduced to the criterion of 
simplicity, there is no reason to accept it in the light of our analysis given above. The 
aforementioned equivalence relation of the predicates of fit and simplicity does not provide 
any reason for assuming a relation of reduction between the two criteria, neither with respect 
to their extensions nor to their intensions. As we do not suppose that Swinburne uses the 
expressions ‘can be reduced to‘ and ‘boils down to‘ as purely rhetorical phrases, we can only 
express our hope that Swinburne will fill in this blank in his line of argument. 
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3    Neglected Aspects of Theory Change 
In the preceding section we have stressed that the criteria of simplicity and fit with 
background theories result in preference of the same theories, although they obviously have a 
different meaning. We have also tried to show that Swinburne’s thesis that the criterion of fit 
with background evidence can be reduced to the criteria of simplicity and yielding the data is 
ill-founded. It will now be our aim to investigate the adequacy of both criteria to central 
aspects of theoretical change. As will become clear from the following considerations, 
criteria of theory choice should not only be assessed as to whether they correctly yield the 
theoretical decisions scientists actually make, but whether they are suitable for an adequate 
reconstruction of the pivotal factors of theoretical progress. Particularly, in scientific practice 
theory choice scenarios do not occur methodologically unconditioned and without complex 
empirical as well as theoretical reasoning preceding the very situation of theoretical choice. 
Typically, scientists reflect on several aspects of theory confirmation by drawing on empirical 
data and of theoretical plausibility in view of background theories, before they are in a 
position to choose between two or more rivaling theories. In consequence of this, one has to 
adopt an historical or dynamical standpoint in order to fully understand the mechanisms by 
which scientific developments are driven. 
In what follows we will have a closer look at three methodological aspects of theoretical 
change we regard as central to scientific progress, namely relevance of empirical data, 
experimental methods and novel data. In doing so, we will draw on two criteria of adequacy 
of the reconstruction of scientific practice. On the one hand, the most prevalent elements of 
scientific methodology necessary for understanding the development, namely evaluation and 
choice of theories should be included in any comprehensive account of science. On the other 
hand, a reconstruction of scientific practice and theoretical progress can be expected to shed 
light on the various methodological factors responsible for the truth-conduciveness of 
scientific methods and theories. Whereas the first criterion of adequacy seems to be 
unproblematic from any philosophical perspective, the second one clearly begs the question 
against antirealists of the empiricist brand. Swinburne, however, is in full accordance with the 
realist claim that science is in the truth business and that scientific progress is closely linked 
to the notion of truth-conduciveness. It therefore seems to be fair to pit the Swinburnian 
criterion of simplicity against the criterion of fit with background theories in regard of the 
question of how truth enters the scientific stage. 
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3.1    Central Aspects of Theoretical Change 
3.1.1    Relevance of Empirical Data 
It can be shown by many examples from the history of science, and argued for on 
philosophical grounds, that a theory’s confirmed empirical consequences do not speak in 
favour of the theory in question with equal force. Rather, pieces of empirical evidence 
considerably differ with respect to their confirming or disconfirming power, and scientists are 
well aware of the fact that most of the confirmed empirical consequences of theories do not 
have any importance for theoretical choices at all. The special relevance of some empirical 
data is typically measured in the light of accepted background theories. Take, for instance, the 
famous examples of light deflection by the sun and the precession of mercury’s perihelion in 
the context of evaluating the trustworthiness of Einstein’s theory of general relativity. The 
confirming data resulting from these phenomena have undoubtedly much more relevance to 
general relativity than many of this theory’s other consequences, and they certainly do allow 
favouring Einstein over Newton precisely because they do not accord with the accepted 
theoretical background provided by classical physics. 
Simplicity in Swinburne’s sense, however, does not tell us anything of methodological 
interest about this feature of data and theory evaluation. It is rather fit with background 
theories in terms of plausibility or acceptability which elucidates the decisive role of what we 
already claim to know for how to deal with what we possibly should believe instead. 
 
3.1.2    Experimental Methods 
In many sciences scenarios of theory choice are typically intertwined with the development 
and results of highly theory-laden experimental methods. In elementary particle physics, for 
instance, enormous theoretical as well as technical efforts are made for the production of 
particle detectors of various sorts in order to get reliable experimental results as to the 
confirmation or disconfirmation of the existence of postulated micro-entities. Moreover, it is 
of great importance for designing significant experiments to know about counter-effects 
which might distort the empirical data provided by the experimental apparatuses. With respect 
to these features of experimental method background theories play the decisive role. The 
design and control of experiments is to a very large extent dependent on what we already 
believe, especially about theoretical entities involved in the experimental setups. It is only by 
experiments thus theoretically guided, however, that reliable data are gained for the 
confirmation or disconfirmation of novel theoretical proposals. What is even more, theory 
choice scenarios characteristic for significant episodes of scientific progress usually do not 
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occur, unless novel data have been provided by means of experimental methods informed by 
background theories. 
Again, it seems to be impossible or, at least, to lead to implausible contrivances, to reconstruct 
this salient aspect of theory change under the aegis of Swinburne’s theory choice criterion of 
simplicity. None of the six facets of his concept of simplicity gives rise to the theoretically 
guided methods of experimental design mentioned above. Scientists willing to develop new 
instruments so as to explore a hitherto unknown part or region of reality would be at a loss, if 
they relied on the concept of simplicity instead of trying to understand the functioning of 
probably reliable experimental means on the basis of their theoretical knowledge. 
 
3.1.3    Novel Data 
Finally, we do not see how Swinburne is able to capture the importance of so-called novel 
data as, for example, Galileo’s observation of the phases of Venus in favour of Copernicus’ 
heliocentric model of our planetary system. It is, however, relevant to recognize the decisive 
function novel data fulfil for theory choice scenarios. When it comes to the question of how 
such scenarios arise at all, and by what kind of reasoning they are motivated, one has to refer 
to novel data and their methodological role in experimenta crucis. And novel data, in turn, 
lead our attention to the experimental methods stressed in the preceding paragraph, since it is 
only by means of such methods that novel data relevant for making decisions in theory choice 
scenarios can be provided. 
 
Apparently, all three elements of theory change are entangled with each other in complex and 
intricate ways, and they all hinge on background theories already accepted in the scientific 
community. Background theories guide the development of experimental methods which, in 
turn, deliver novel data needed to choose between theory rivals. Novel data, again, very often 
induce theory choice scenarios in the first place. And theoretical proposals confirmed by 
novel data bring the dynamics of theory change to a full historical circle by providing 
themselves a new theoretical background in the light of which new experimental methods are 
developed and against which even newer theoretical proposals are evaluated. 
 
3.2    Truth-conduciveness 
Another aspect of theoretical change which is of major concern to any realist approach to 
progress in science and which we have not yet come to discuss, is the notion of truth-
conduciveness. Again, it seems as if Swinburne’s account of simplicity and its role for theory 
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choice does not give us any clue towards a deeper understanding of the aspect in question, i.e. 
provide us with insight in the mechanisms by which truth comes into the theoretical play and 
is approached ever closer through the historical development of science. 
If, contrary to Swinburne’s aprioristic likings, one is inclined to assume that by contingent 
historical reasons background theories are already approximately true, a model of how truth 
enters into experimental methods and of how new theoretical proposals get closer to the truth 
within modern science appears to be at hand. To be sure, bringing truth into play via the 
approximate truth of background theories is a thoroughly empirical manoeuvre, since it is by 
no means apriorily guaranteed, or made probable, that we have available true or truthlike 
theories. But as long as Swinburne fails to demonstrate that simplicity can be construed as a 
truth-conducive a priori criterion of theory choice, it seems by far more promising to 
investigate the historical factors of truth-conduciveness in science than to draw upon the 
notion of simplicity. At least Swinburne still owes us an a priori argument for the truth-
orientedness of the theory choice criterion of simplicity. 
 
4    Conclusion 
First, contrary to Swinburne’s claims, there is little reason to believe that the theory choice 
criterion of fit with background theories can be reduced to the criteria of simplicity and 
yielding the data. If Swinburne’s notion of background evidence is disambiguated by splitting 
it up into the notions of background theories and background data, it can be shown that the 
criteria of fit with background theories and of simplicity are equivalent with respect to actual 
theory choice processes although they clearly differ in meaning. At any rate, there seems to be 
no substantive relation of reduction between the two. 
Second, the undertaking of adequately reconstructing theoretical changes in science seems to 
fail dramatically if simplicity is regarded as a key criterion of theory choice. If the criterion of 
fit with background theories is spelled out in terms of how plausible or acceptable are (1) 
empirical data with respect to their confirming power, (2) experimental methods with regard 
to their reliability, and (3) new theoretical proposals with regard to their truth, it is no longer 
reasonable to suppose that it can be reduced to, or even partly explained by, simplicity. On the 
contrary, it seems much more adequate to reconstruct theory choice scenarios along the lines 
of methodologically oriented plausibility or acceptability considerations. 
 
